Firm life cycle and detection of accrual-based earnings manipulation by Chang, Hye Sun
  
 
 
 
 
 
FIRM LIFE CYCLE AND DETECTION OF ACCRUAL-BASED EARNINGS 
MANIPULATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
HYE SUN CHANG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Accountancy 
in the Graduate College of the  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
                  
                                  
Doctoral Committee: 
 
Associate Professor Laura Yue Li, Chair and Director of Research 
Professor Theodore Sougiannis 
Assistant Professor Michael P. Donohoe  
Associate Professor Feng Liang 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
 
The identification of estimation samples is important for estimating discretionary 
accruals using an accrual model. This study proposes an alternative identification of estimation 
samples using a firm’s life cycle (i.e., life cycle-based estimation samples). Analyses using U.S. 
and international data show that when detecting accrual manipulation, life cycle-based 
estimation samples outperform industry-based or size-based estimation samples in sample 
retention, specification, and detection power. Improved detection power by life cycle-based 
estimation samples is also evident in the AAERs sample. Lastly, I reexamine Dechow, 
Richardson, and Tuna (DRT) (2003) and Teoh, Wong, and Rao (TWR) (1998) applying life 
cycle-based estimation samples. I find that life cycle-based estimation samples change the 
inferences from DRT by improving test power and mitigate misspecification in TWR. 
Collectively, the current study provides empirical evidence that supports the use of life cycle-
based estimation samples over other existing estimation samples.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An extensive body of accounting literature (Kothari 2001; Dechow et al. 2010) uses 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for accrual-based earnings manipulation. Empirically, 
discretionary accruals are estimated using an accrual model within certain estimation samples 
where normal accrual generating processes are assumed to be homogeneous.1  While the 
specification of widely-used accrual models (i.e., variants of the Jones model and the Dechow-
Dichev model) has been questioned and evaluated (Dechow et al. 1995; Kothari et al. 2005; 
Stubben 2010), there is very limited research on the identification of estimation samples. The 
identification of estimation samples is important because superior estimation samples enable 
the accrual model to adequately capture normal accrual generating processes and thus allow 
separating normal and discretionary accruals with precision and sufficient power (Dopuch et 
al. 2012). Relying on theories on accruals (e.g., Sloan 1996; Fairfield et al. 2003) and firm life 
cycle (e.g., Liu 2006; Dickinson 2011), this study proposes an alternative identification of 
estimation samples using a firm’s life cycle. I investigate whether using life cycle-based 
estimation samples improves the detection of accrual manipulation. 
Traditionally, researchers estimate an accrual model using estimation samples defined 
as all firms in the same industry, assuming that industry-based estimation samples have 
homogeneous accrual generating processes. Yet, several studies (Dopuch et al. 2012; Owens et 
al. 2013) show that the normal accrual generating processes within an industry are not as 
homogeneous as are implicitly assumed in the literature. Recently, Ecker et al. (2013) point out 
that industry-based estimation samples impose substantial sample attrition, and suggest 
forming estimation samples by similar firm size. Size-based estimation samples resolve the 
problem of sample attrition and yield comparable levels of specification and power of the tests 
                                           
1 Researchers model normal (non-discretionary) accruals as a function of firm characteristics (e.g. change in cash 
sales and PP&E). Normal accrual generating processes refer to the activities that give rise to accruals associated 
with such firm characteristics.  
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for detecting accrual manipulation to industry-based estimation samples. It is, however, 
theoretically unclear how firm size is able to capture homogeneity in normal accrual generating 
processes. 
Estimation samples based on a firm’s life cycle are potentially superior to other 
estimation samples for the following three reasons. First, normal accrual generating processes 
are expected to be relatively homogeneous within each life cycle stage because firms within 
the same life cycle stage have a similar size of investment in both short-term and long-term 
operating assets and share a similar level of profitability and credit policy (Dickinson 2011). 
Second, a firm’s life cycle is defined in a way that allows an ample number of firms in each of 
the five life cycle stages (Introduction, Growth, Mature, Shake-out, and Decline).2 Therefore, 
unlike industry-based estimation samples, life cycle-based estimation samples do not cause 
substantial sample attrition. Third, similar firm characteristics (e.g., size and profitability) 
shared by firms in the same life cycle stage are potentially correlated omitted variables in the 
accrual model and therefore, estimating the accrual model by life cycle can mitigate the 
misspecification problem. Statistically, the increased number of observations and 
homogeneous estimation samples could lead to tests with higher power and better goodness of 
fit.  
To test different identifications of estimation samples, I employ the most popular 
accrual model, the modified Jones model. Estimation of the modified Jones model shows that 
the model estimates (i.e., the coefficients on change in cash sales and PP&E) and detection 
power for accrual manipulation vary systematically across life cycle stages as predicted by 
                                           
2 A firm’s life cycle stage is determined by the patterns of cash flows from operating, investing, and financing 
activities (Dickinson 2011). When estimating an accrual model, the dependent variable is total accruals and 
researchers require data for earnings before extraordinary items (ibc) and cash flows from operating activities 
(oancf) to calculate total accruals (=ibc-oancf). Non-missing values for these variables are the typical minimum 
requirements for estimating an accrual model. When cash flows from operating activities (oancf) are reported, 
both cash flows from investing activities (ivncf) and cash flows from financing activities (fincf) are also reported 
in Compustat. Accordingly, no/little additional information is required for life cycle-based estimation samples 
beyond the data for estimating an accrual model. 
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existing theories of life cycle (e.g., Spence 1977, 1979). First, the coefficient of change in cash 
sales is significantly more positive for introduction firms, consistent with firms in this stage 
investing heavily in working capital while having operating cash outflows. For firms in the 
growth and mature stages, the coefficient of change in cash sales gradually decreases because 
of the increase in operating cash flows. Second, the coefficient of PP&E is significantly more 
negative for growth firms, suggesting that growth firms have a newer and larger scale of 
investment in PP&E. Third, an adjusted R2 and detection power for accrual manipulation in 
simulations are highest among growth and mature firms and lowest among introduction and 
decline firms, consistent with firms in the early or late life cycle stage being more 
heterogeneous from each other. Fourth, detection power is significantly higher for firms whose 
life cycle stages remain unchanged for two or three consecutive years, indicating that life cycle 
transitions capture significant changes in accrual generating processes. 
I then compare the performance of life cycle-based estimation samples to that of 
industry-based and size-based estimation samples. The simulation results for a large U.S. 
sample provide three insights. One, the modified Jones model is well-specified regardless of 
which identification of estimation samples is used. Two, both life cycle-based and size-based 
estimation samples outperform industry-based estimation samples in detecting seeded accrual 
manipulation and mitigating sample loss. Three, matching a firm-year from each life cycle 
stage with its industry or size peers does not provide much improvement in the detection of 
accrual manipulation compared to when estimation samples are formed by firm life cycle alone. 
Smaller samples face the problem of substantial sample attrition and require higher 
levels of homogeneity in normal accrual generating processes within estimation samples. To 
further compare the performance of different estimation sample identifications in smaller 
samples, I utilize two settings: randomly selected small U.S. samples (N=500 to 15,000), and 
international samples (Compustat Global). I document two advantages of using life cycle-based 
4 
estimation samples in these settings. First, choosing life cycle-based estimation samples 
mitigates the sample attrition to a significant extent. For example, when 30 or more 
observations are required for each industry and year, 52.43% international observations are 
excluded from the sample while life cycle-based estimation samples reduce this percentage to 
12.97%. Second, in both small U.S. samples and international samples, the detection power of 
life cycle-based estimation samples is significantly higher than that of industry-based or size-
based estimation samples, confirming the efficacy of life cycle-based estimation samples when 
sample size is relatively small. Supplemental tests suggest that these simulation results are not 
sensitive to alternative accrual models and/or different approaches to seed manipulation.  
Similar to detection power, specification is also an important concern in earnings 
management studies. Prior studies (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995) conclude all models reject the 
null hypothesis of no earnings management at rates exceeding the specified test levels when 
applied to samples of firms with extreme performance. Given similar levels of firm 
performance (in multiple dimensions of performance metrics) in the same life cycle stage, a 
correlated omitted variables problem may be alleviated by life cycle-based grouping. 
Consequently, life cycle-based estimation samples are less likely to yield misspecified tests in 
extreme performance samples. Consistent with this prediction, I find that using life cycle-based 
estimation samples mitigates misspecification for firms with extreme operating performance 
(i.e., extreme operating cash flows (OCF) and extreme return on assets (ROA)).   
Next, I investigate which estimation samples generate the highest detection power for 
actual accrual manipulation. I use the cases in the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases (AAERs) sample as a proxy for actual accrual manipulation. The AAERs database 
primarily includes enforcement actions against firms in which the SEC alleges that earnings 
manipulation has taken place (Dechow et al. 2011). Results show that detection power for 
actual accrual manipulation is 46% (36%) higher when the accrual model is estimated by life 
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cycle and year than by industry and year (by size and year). These findings reflect that when 
firms are grouped with homogeneous peers, there is a higher chance of detecting accrual 
manipulation. 
Lastly, I reexamine Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (DRT) (2003) and Teoh, Wong, and 
Rao (TWR) (1998) applying life cycle-based estimation samples to each study. DRT 
hypothesize that boosting discretionary accruals to avoid reporting a loss is the reason for the 
kink in the earnings distribution (i.e., too few firms report small losses, too many firms report 
small profits). However, in their study, accrual models estimated within each industry and year 
generate discretionary accruals of small profit firms that are statistically indifferent from those 
of small loss firms. Using life cycle-based estimation samples, I find significantly larger 
discretionary accruals for small profit firms than for small loss firms consistent with the kink 
being caused by earnings management. Also, TWR find evidence that IPO firms report high 
earnings during the IPO by reporting discretionary accruals (estimated using industry-based 
estimation samples) aggressively. However, IPO firms are generally high performance 
companies. If firm performance is a potentially omitted correlated variable in the accrual model, 
misspecification is expected to be relatively high in the IPO setting. Using life cycle-based 
estimation samples, I find that discretionary accruals at the time of IPO are significantly lower 
than the ones reported in TWR. Collectively, these results indicate that life cycle-based 
estimation samples not only improve detection power but also mitigate misspecification.  
 This study contributes to the accruals literature (Kothari 2001; Dechow et al. 2010) by 
proposing a theoretically-grounded alternative identification of estimation samples for the 
accrual model estimation. From a practical perspective, life cycle-based estimation samples 
impose little to no sample loss and yield higher detection power in samples of varying number 
of observations, benefitting studies using small samples and international data in particular. 
Life cycle-based estimation samples also benefit earnings management studies that use extreme 
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performance samples (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998; Shivakumar 2000; Ball and Shivakumar 2008) by 
mitigating misspecification. Lastly, this study complements studies on identifying 
economically-related peer firms (Dichev et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2014) and extends the firm life 
cycle literature (Spence 1977, 1979, 1981; Anthony and Ramesh 1992; Dickinson 2011). Prior 
research on identifying peer firms has been largely centered on refining the industry 
classification (Lee et al. 2014). In addition, studies on firm life cycle (e.g., Anthony and 
Ramesh 1992) have focused on the role of life cycle in valuation settings. This study identifies 
peer firms based on life cycle and demonstrates the advantages of using these peers in the 
context of accruals. 
Section II provides related literature on accrual models and estimation samples, and 
Section III presents theoretical relations between life cycle and accruals. Sample, descriptive 
data, and model estimation are described in Section IV. Section V presents simulation 
procedures and results for U.S. samples, international samples, extreme performance samples, 
and the AAER sample. Section VI reexamines Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) and Teoh, 
Wong, and Rao (1998) using life cycle-based estimation samples. Section VII presents 
supplemental analyses and Section VIII concludes. 
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II. RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1. Accrual Models  
Jones-type accrual models have been the most popular in the literature. Jones (1991) 
is the first study that considers residuals from the expectation model for total accruals as 
estimated discretionary accruals. In the Jones model, change in sales and PP&E are included 
as two economic drivers that determine normal accruals. Accordingly, regression residuals, 
which are assumed to be orthogonal to these economic drivers, could represent discretionary 
accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) replace change in sales in the Jones model with change in cash 
sales (∆SALESit-∆RECit) (see Equation (1)). This modified version of Jones model (known as 
the modified Jones model) is intended to capture revenue manipulation that occurs through the 
misstatement of accounts receivable. Based on its popularity in the literature (Collins et al. 
2012), the current study employs the modified Jones model to compare the performance of life 
cycle-based estimation samples to that of other alternative estimation samples. In Equation (1), 
an error term (εit) represents discretionary accruals and the remaining terms (predicted value 
of regression) represent normal accruals. 
TAit Assetit-1⁄ =α+β1[1 Assetit-1⁄ ]+β2[(∆SALESit-∆RECit)/Assetit-1]+β3[PPEit Assetit-1]+εit⁄  (1) 
where TAit is total accruals for firm i in year t, ∆SALESit-∆RECit is change in cash sales for 
firm i in year t, PPEit is net property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t, 1 Assetit-1⁄  is 
an intercept scaled by total assets for firm i in year t-1, and εit is an error term for firm i in 
year t.  
Accrual models, in general, suffer from measurement errors and correlated omitted 
variables, which lead to Type I and Type II errors. Type I errors (also known as misspecification) 
are defined as rejection of a true null hypothesis of no earnings management. Dechow et al. 
(1995, p. 193) conclude that all accrual models appear well-specified when applied to a random 
sample, but all models reject the null hypothesis of no earnings management at rates exceeding 
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the specified test levels when applied to samples of firms with extreme performance. To 
mitigate Type I errors, Kothari et al. (2005) develop performance-matched accrual models. In 
the matching procedures, they first identify a firm (i.e., control firm) with the closest level of 
return on assets to that of the sample firm within each industry and year and then deduct the 
control firm’s discretionary accruals estimated using either Jones or modified Jones model from 
those of the sample firm.3 While the performance matching procedure mitigates Type I errors, 
it is known to augment Type II errors. Type II errors (=1-Power) are defined as failure to reject 
a false null hypothesis of no earnings management.  
In an attempt to reduce both Type I and Type II errors, researchers often modify their 
choice of economic drivers that are included in accrual models (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995; 
Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2005). For example, Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
include past, present, and future cash flows as determinants of working capital accruals based 
on an accounting relation between accruals and cash flows. 4  Also, several studies (e.g., 
McNichols and Wilson 1988; Stubben 2010; Choudhary et al. 2013) focus on specific accruals 
to mitigate measurement errors caused by including all other accruals and irrelevant economic 
drivers to accruals of a researcher’s choice. In particular, Stubben (2010) shows improvement 
in detecting accrual manipulation by modeling a single earnings component (revenue) and the 
related accrual (accounts receivable). Furthermore, more recent studies improve the 
specification and power of tests for detecting accrual manipulation by incorporating accrual 
                                           
3  Kothari et al. (2005) model the level of discretionary accruals (i.e., discretionary accruals adjusted for a 
performance-matched firm’s discretionary accruals). Rather than modeling the level of discretionary accruals, this 
study focuses on how to form estimation samples when estimating an existing accrual model. For example, in 
combining life cycle-based estimation samples with the performance-matched accrual model, researchers could 
identify a performance-matched control firm within each life cycle stage (rather than within each industry).  
4 The accounting system provides for accruals, i.e., temporary adjustments that shift the recognition of cash flows 
over time (Dechow and Dichev 2002). Accruals refer to exchanges of goods/services for which cash has not yet 
been exchanged and deferrals refer to exchanges of cash for which goods/services have not yet been exchanged. 
The terminology “accruals” used in this study includes both accruals and deferrals. To illustrate, suppose an 
introduction firm purchases large quantities of inventory with cash, anticipating increasing product demand. 
Because costs of goods sold are generally recorded when goods are sold, a firm’s inventory purchases are 
considered accruals. Precisely, inventory purchases are deferrals. 
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reversals into the test model (Dechow et al. 2012) or by correcting for heteroscedasticity of 
discretionary accruals within pre-specified estimation samples (Chang et al. 2014).  
Although much emphasis in prior literature has been placed on the specification of 
accrual models, very little attention has been paid to how estimation samples for accrual models 
are identified. This study focuses on which estimation samples perform best in lowering both 
Type I and Type II errors when detecting accrual manipulation. 
2.2. Estimation Samples  
 When estimating accrual models, the identification of estimation samples is an 
important issue because it significantly influences the specification and power of tests for 
detecting accrual manipulation as well as the extent of sample attrition (Ecker et al. 2013). 
Estimation samples used in prior literature on accrual models include (1) estimation samples 
by each firm, (2) estimation samples based on industry membership, and (3) estimation samples 
based on similar firm size. 
Accrual models can be estimated at the firm level under the assumption that a firm has 
a stable normal accrual generating process over time (Jones 1991). Estimation samples by each 
firm allow cross-sectional variation in parameter estimates but impose strict data requirements 
for a firm to be included for analysis, resulting in substantial sample attrition (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994; Subramanyam 1996). To avoid this issue, researchers commonly estimate 
accrual models cross-sectionally. 5  Milder data requirements in cross-sectional estimation 
likely mitigate potential survivorship bias and lead to higher estimate precision.  
Most researchers select an industry classification scheme from several variants (e.g., 
SIC, NAICS, GICS, and Fama-French 12 industry) to delineate industrial activities depending 
                                           
5 Collins et al. (2012) note that 17 of 22 studies referenced in Dechow et al. (2010) estimate accrual models cross-
sectionally and only 4 studies employ time-series firm-specific estimation.  
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on the context of their study.6 Estimation samples based on industry membership assume that 
firms in the same industry have similar normal accrual generating processes. To some extent, 
accrual generating processes could be captured by industry membership because firms in the 
same industry share similar operations and apply similar accounting rules (Bartov et al. 2000). 
For instance, firms in the financial industry generate accruals (e.g., loan loss reserves) largely 
from their financial assets/liabilities that are measured at fair value. On the contrary, for 
manufacturing firms, most accruals arise from PP&E, which are reported at historical cost on 
the balance sheet. 
Nevertheless, recent studies (Dopuch et al. 2012; Owens et al. 2013) suggest that the 
normal accrual generating processes within an industry are not homogeneous due to firms’ 
varying business strategies and differing sensitivity to business shocks. In addition, industry-
based estimation samples have three inherent shortcomings. First, because many firms 
currently compete in multiple industries and their product offerings are quite diverse, it is often 
challenging to identify a firm’s primary industry (Dickinson 2011). For instance, General 
Electric (GE) operates through four divisions, such as Energy (inactive 2013), Technology 
Infrastructure, Capital Finance, and Consumer and Industrial. Due to ambiguity in determining 
GE’s primary industry, data vendors, such as Compustat, assign a non-classifiable SIC code 
(9997) to GE.7 Second, imposing requirements for estimating a regression model (e.g., 10 or 
more observations per covariate) leads to substantial sample attrition. Specifically, in the 
Compustat Global database (1988-2009), the average number of firms per industry is 3.5 (SIC 
2), 1.8 (SIC 3), and 1.6 (SIC 4) (Ecker et al. 2013). Lastly, two firms with different business 
                                           
6 The SIC and NAICS systems are based on a production-based framework for delineating industries, which was 
developed by governmental agencies (i.e., Federal Census Bureau). On the other hand, the Fama-French industry 
classifications were developed by financial academics (Fama and French 1997), aiming to form industry groups 
that are more likely to share common risk characteristics. Lastly, the GICS structure was the result of collaboration 
between MSCI and S&P. In assigning firms to certain industries, S&P and MSCI analysts are guided by 
information from annual reports and financial statements, as well as investment research reports and other industry 
information. See Bhojraj et al. (2003) for discussion about these industry classification schemes. 
7 Other examples include Simens AG, ABB Ltd, and Seaboard Corporation. 
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environments could still belong to the same industry (Dopuch et al. 2012). For example, the 
same two-digit SIC code (35) is assigned to makers of heavy equipment for the oil and gas 
industry, producers of video games, manufacturers of lawn mowers, and makers of personal 
computers (Bernard and Skinner 1996). 
To address limitations imposed by industry-based estimation samples, Ecker et al. 
(2013) propose identifying estimation samples based on similarity in firm size. The authors 
find that estimation samples based on similar firm size perform at least as well as estimation 
samples based on industry membership in detecting accrual manipulation for both U.S. data 
and non-U.S. data. The use of size-based estimation samples is especially beneficial to 
international studies because it mitigates sample attrition. However, despite these advantages 
of size-based estimation samples, it is not obvious through which mechanisms firm size 
captures homogeneity in accrual generating processes. Moreover, it is possible that even when 
firm size captures homogeneity in accrual generating processes, smaller samples have firms 
that differ in size to a greater extent. Relying on theories on accruals (e.g., Sloan 1996; Fairfield 
et al. 2003) and firm life cycle (e.g., Liu 2006; Dickinson 2011), this study proposes using life 
cycle-based estimation samples as more theoretically-grounded alternative estimation samples.  
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III. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section, I provide theoretical background on how normal accrual generating 
processes are likely to be homogeneous within each life cycle stage. Normal accrual generating 
processes are represented by the association between total accruals and its determinants. In the 
modified Jones model, the determinants of total accruals include change in cash sales and 
PP&E. I discuss how the association between total accruals and its determinants vary across 
life cycle stages below.  
3.1. Life Cycle and Normal Accrual Generating Processes 
Normal accrual generating processes likely vary across life cycle stages because firms 
under different life cycle stages have different production capacity, investment opportunity sets, 
and risk (Park and Chen 2006). For example, consider a firm under two different life cycle 
stages (e.g., a growth firm and a decline firm). Suppose also that these firms are identical in all 
respects except their production capacity. For any given shock to sales (e.g., a large increase in 
sales), a growth firm can generate accruals by further increasing inventory because it has 
gradually increased its production capacity. A decline firm, however, cannot generate accruals 
as much as a growth firm because it generally liquidates assets and does not have enough 
production capacity to accommodate the shock to sales.   
Following Dickinson (2011), I classify each firm-year into one of the five life cycle 
stages (Introduction, Growth, Mature, Shake-out, and Decline) based on the patterns of cash 
flows from operating, investing, and financing activities.8 Prior to Dickinson (2011), studies 
rely on a composite of economic characteristics, such as dividend payout, sales growth, and 
                                           
8 The signs (+/−) of cash flows from operating, investing, and financing activities generate the following eight 
combinations. Dickinson (2011) collapses these eight combinations into five life cycle stages: Introduction, 
Growth, Mature, Shake-out, and Decline. 
Cash Flows Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out Decline 
Operating − + + − + + − − 
Investing − − − − + + + + 
Financing + + − − + − + − 
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age, and conduct portfolio sorts to draw distinctions between life cycle stages. These sorting 
methods, however, require an ex ante assumption about the underlying distribution of life cycle 
membership (i.e., uniform distribution). Dickinson’s classification based on the patterns of cash 
flows reflects the result of firm performance and the allocation of resources, as opposed to an 
ad hoc assignment. 
Firms in the introduction stage (where an innovation is first produced) incur cash 
outflows from operating and investing activities and inflows from financing activities because 
those firms make early large investment funded by external stakeholders (Jovanovic 1982; 
Spence 1977, 1979; Jensen 1986). Their heavy investment is necessary for developing, 
introducing, and marketing a new product (Spence 1977, 1979). As a result, investment in 
operating assets significantly increases firms’ working capital accruals (e.g., inventory) in the 
introduction stage (Liu 2006). Together with operating cash outflows, heavy investment in 
working capital makes the coefficient on change in cash sales larger in the introduction stage. 
Furthermore, in this stage, firms gradually accumulate fixed assets, but their carrying amount 
and depreciation expense are small compared to the amounts in the growth and mature stages 
(Dickinson 2011). Accordingly, the absolute value of the coefficient on PP&E is likely to be 
smaller in the introduction stage than in the other stages that carry a large amount of 
depreciation expense.  
Firms in the growth stage (where the number of producers increases dramatically) have 
similar cash flow patterns to introduction firms except for cash inflows from operating 
activities (Spence 1977, 1979; Dickinson 2011). To deal with extremely intense competition, 
growth firms tend to expand inventory capacity and sell their products on credit, resulting in 
the increase in working capital accruals (e.g., inventory and accounts receivable) (Dechow et 
al. 1998; Bushman et al. 2012; Liu 2006). Although growth firms experience the increase in 
working capital accruals related to sales growth, high operating cash inflows could result in the 
14 
smaller coefficient on change in cash sales in the growth stage than in other stages. Using cash 
inflows generated by operating activities and funded by external stakeholders, these growth 
firms further expand production capacity (e.g., PP&E) to accommodate increasing customer 
demand. Dickinson (2011) documents that PP&E (as a main component of total assets) and the 
corresponding depreciation expense are maximized in this stage. Hence, the absolute value of 
the coefficient of PP&E is also expected to be maximized in the growth stage.  
Firms in the mature stage (where the number of producers reaches a maximum) have 
operating efficiency through increased knowledge of operations, resulting in cash inflows from 
operating activities (Spence 1977, 1979; Wernerfelt 1985). Mature firms, however, incur cash 
outflows from investing and financing activities due to obsolescence in investment previously 
made and distribution of excess funds, respectively (Jovanovic 1982; Jensen 1986). Also, 
mature firms focus on maintaining the market share and current profitability rather than making 
new investment. Their business strategy therefore aims to improve production processes (e.g., 
quality control) and to minimize manufacturing costs (Spence 1981; Wernerfelt 1985). 
However, mature firms are characterized as having a lower level of working capital accruals 
because they cut investment in short-term operating assets while generating high operating cash 
inflows (Fairfield et al. 2003; Liu 2006). Therefore, the coefficient on change in cash sales 
could be relatively smaller in the mature stage than in other stages. Furthermore, because 
mature firms also reduce investment in long-term operating assets (i.e., PP&E) and thus 
depreciation expense gradually decreases, the absolute value of the coefficient on PP&E may 
decrease in the mature stage compared to other life cycle stages, especially, the growth stage.   
In the shake-out stage, the number of producers begins to decline (Gort and Klepper 
1982). Because theory is silent about cash flows for shake-out firms, firms are by default 
classified as shake-out firms if the cash flow patterns do not fall into one of the other 
theoretically defined stages (Dickinson 2011) (see footnote 8). Moreover, facing declining 
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profitability, shake-out firms either make new investment to rejuvenate the business or begin 
downsizing the company. Hence, the magnitudes of the coefficients on change in cash sales 
and PP&E are indeterminable from either cash flows or investment patterns in the shake-out 
stage.  
Lastly, firms in the decline stage (where there is essentially a zero net entry) experience 
cash outflows from operating activities and cash inflows from investing activities due to 
declining growth rates and liquidation of assets, respectively (Wernerfelt 1985). Furthermore, 
those firms have positive or negative cash flows from financing activities depending on 
whether debts are repaid or renegotiated. Despite low investment in working capital, operating 
cash outflows for decline firms make the coefficient on change in cash sales larger in the 
decline stage than in the other stages with operating cash inflows. To cope with negative 
operating cash flows and low profitability, decline firms engage in liquidation. Liquidation 
activities (e.g., selling off PP&E, downsizing and undertaking restructuring) involve significant 
accounting treatments. For example, liquidating firms adjust their book value to reflect 
liquidation value to avoid assets being overstated or liabilities being understated (Dechow and 
Ge 2006). Therefore, a small amount of fixed assets and depreciation expense are expected in 
this stage and the absolute value of the coefficient of PP&E in the decline stage is likely to be 
smaller than that in other stages (Francis et al. 1996; Liu 2006; Dickinson 2011).  
As described, normal accrual generating processes are expected to vary with a firm’s 
life cycle. The following section provides the framework for how life cycle-based estimation 
samples improve the detection of accrual manipulation. 
3.2. Advantages of Estimation Samples by Life Cycle   
 Researchers use the following linear framework (McNichols and Wilson 1988) in the 
detection of accrual manipulation.  
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DAPit=α+βPARTit+μit+εit                                                    (2)                                                                   
where DAPit  is a discretionary accrual proxy, PARTit  is a dummy variable partitioning 
observations into two groups for which earnings management predictions are specified by the 
researcher, μ
it
 is other relevant variables influencing discretionary accruals and measurement 
errors, and εit is an error term that is independently and identically normally distributed.  
Because researchers cannot easily identify other relevant factors influencing 
discretionary accruals (μ
it
), the detection model for accrual manipulation typically estimated 
by the researcher can be represented as  
DAPit=?̂?+?̂?PARTit+eit                                                       (3)                                                                                      
 By regressing DAPit  on PARTit , researchers essentially aim to (1) explain the 
variation in DAPit  by the variation in PARTit and (2) perform a hypothesis test concerning 
whether the null hypothesis of no earnings management is rejected. The first objective is shown 
in the R2 and the second objective is shown in the t-statistic. 
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where R2 is the coefficient of determination (a measure of goodness of fit), eit is an error 
term, and DAPit̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the mean for a discretionary accrual proxy. 
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where b̂  is the coefficient on PARTit , 𝑛  is the total number of observations, s𝜀  is the 
standard error of the regression, and sPART is the sample standard deviation of PARTit. 
 In this framework, life cycle-based estimation samples provide three advantages. First, 
when estimation samples based on a firm’s life cycle are homogeneous, the standard deviation 
of estimated discretionary accruals becomes smaller. Consequently, life cycle-based estimation 
17 
samples decrease the denominator in Equation (4) and in turn increase R2. Second, holding b̂ 
constant, the power of the t-test for earnings management is increasing in the total number of 
observations (𝑛). Because a firm’s life cycle is defined in a way that allows an ample number 
of firms in each life cycle stage, life cycle-based estimation samples mitigate sample attrition 
(i.e., an increase in 𝑛), increasing the t-statistic in Equation (5). Third, firms in the same life 
cycle share similar firm characteristics and those firm characteristics are potentially omitted 
correlated variables in the accrual model. For instance, if other omitted variables (μ
it
) are 
positively correlated with PARTit, then the estimated coefficient on PARTit will be biased 
away from zero (i.e., an increase in Type I errors) (Dechow et al. 1995). Grouping firms by 
similar firm characteristics likely mitigates this possibility. In addition, by controlling for 
omitted correlated variables, the standard deviation of the combined impact of other 
determinants of discretionary accruals becomes smaller (i.e., a decrease in sε) and the t-statistic 
in Equation (5) increases. In this study, I investigate these advantages of life cycle-based 
estimation samples by performing simulation procedures using the above framework.  
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IV. SAMPLE, DESCRIPTIVE DATA, AND MODEL ESTIMATION 
4.1. Sample  
I begin with Compustat firms for the years 1988-2012. The sample period begins in 
1988 because cash flows from operating activities become available with the disclosure 
requirement under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 95. I measure 
total accruals by subtracting cash flows from operating activities (oancf) from earnings before 
extraordinary items (ibc) (i.e., cash flow statement approach).9 All the input variables in the 
modified Jones model (i.e., total accruals, change in cash sales and PP&E) are deflated by 
lagged total assets and are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
 Consistent with prior research (e.g., Stubben 2010; Ecker et al. 2013), samples are 
restricted to non-regulated industries (i.e., non-utilities and non-financial industries) because 
accruals of regulated industries differ from those of other industries. Next, I exclude firm-year 
observations with missing values for the input variables in the modified Jones model and 
observations with the absolute value of total accruals scaled by total assets exceeding one to 
avoid the influence of outliers (Kothari et al. 2005). Lastly, I require each subgroup, formed by 
either industry membership, or by life cycle, or by similar size, to have 31 firm-year 
observations (one event firm-year and 30 non-event firm-years). Discretionary accruals are the 
regression model-based residual estimates, and a commonly-used rule of thumb in the statistics 
literature to obtain reasonable power is to use at least 10 observations per covariate (Harrell 
2001; Babyak 2004). The modified Jones model has three covariates, including a scaled 
intercept (=1/Assett-1) and thus I require 30 observations (excluding an event firm-year) for 
each subsample when estimating accrual models.10 These screens result in data comprising 
                                           
9 The balance sheet approach to measure total accruals involves large measurement errors and as a result, reduces 
the power in detecting accrual manipulation (Hribar and Collins 2002). 
10 Kothari et al. (2005) suggest that researchers include a scaled intercept in the estimation for several reasons. 
First, it provides an additional control for heteroscedasticity not alleviated by using assets as the deflator. Second, 
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134,944 firm-year observations.11 The total sample consists of 25,965 introduction firms, 
37,180 growth firms, 48,426 mature firms, 12,303 shake-out firms, and 11,070 decline firms.  
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of key variables by each life cycle stage. The mean 
total accruals (TA) are −0.070, −0.077, −0.083, −0.071, and −0.061 of lagged total assets in the 
introduction, growth, mature, shake-out, and decline stage, respectively. The negative total 
accruals suggest that the magnitude of depreciation expense dominates that of working capital 
accruals. Variation in accruals aside from depreciation expense is manifest in working capital 
accruals (WCA). Consistent with Liu (2006), working capital accruals (WCA) are positive in 
the introduction and the growth stages (0.058; 0.026) and are negative in the mature, shake-
out, and decline stages (−0.005; −0.014; −0.002). Table 2 also reports that change in sales 
(△SALES) is the highest for growth firms, followed by introduction firms. Similar to change in 
sales (△SALES), change in cash sales (△SALES−△REC) is highest for growth firms, 
confirming that life cycle classification based on the patterns of cash flows appropriately 
identifies the growth stage. The mean of change in cash sales (△SALES−△REC) is positive 
(negative) in the introduction, growth, mature, and shake-out stage (decline stage), indicating 
growing (diminishing) cash sales in these stages.  
The mean PP&E (PPE) also varies across life cycle stages. For example, PP&E (PPE) 
is largest in the growth stage and smallest in the decline stage. Because depreciation expense 
is an increasing function of PP&E, depreciation expense (Depr) is higher in the introduction, 
growth, and mature stages (0.064, 0.065, and 0.055, respectively) than in the shake-out and 
decline stages (0.044 and 0.045, respectively). The mean operating cash flows, OCF, is 
negative in the introduction (−0.384) and declining stages (−0.253), and is maximized in the 
                                           
it mitigates problems stemming from an omitted size (scale) variable. Third, discretionary accrual measures based 
on models without a scaled intercept are less symmetric, making power of the test comparisons less clear-cut. 
11 Industry-based estimation samples impose a 7% sample loss even by the minimum requirements for estimating 
the accrual model, resulting in 126,690 firm-years. 
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mature stage (0.138). Moreover, profitability measured as return on assets (ROA) varies across 
life cycle stages, with the mature stage having the highest ROA (0.056) and the introduction 
stage having the lowest ROA (−0.457). Lastly, lagged total assets (Assett-1) are the highest in 
the growth (1754.77) and mature (2971.50) stages and lowest in the introduction (235.25) stage, 
indicating that firm size, as measured by lagged total assets, reaches its maximum (minimum) 
when the firm is in the growth and mature stages (introduction stage). In sum, significant F-
statistics reflect that the mean of these key variables differs significantly from one another 
across life cycle stages.  
4.3. Model Estimation by Each Life Cycle Stage 
Table 3 Panel A reports that the coefficients (both magnitude and signs) in the modified 
Jones model vary systematically across life cycle stages. Reported coefficients reflect the 
association between economic drivers (change in sales, and PP&E) and total accruals across 
life cycle stages, respectively. Panel A shows that the coefficients are mostly significant, 
implying that homogeneous estimation samples lead to the estimation of the accrual model 
with precision and sufficient power (Dopuch et al. 2012).  
First, the intercept varies across life cycle stages. Although the intercept is negative in 
all stages, it is the most negative for mature firms (−0.073) consistent with the lowest total 
accruals in the mature stage (see Table 2). Also, the least negative intercept (−0.052) in the 
growth stage reflects heavy investment in working capital made by growth firms (Dechow et 
al. 1998; Bushman et al. 2012; Liu 2006). Second, the coefficient on 1/Assett-1 reflects the 
association between firm size (measured by lagged assets) and total accruals. The negative 
coefficients on 1/Assett-1 across all stages indicate that total accruals increase as firm size 
increases. Specifically, the absolute value of the coefficient on 1/Assett-1 is larger in the growth, 
mature, and shake-out stages.  
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Third, the coefficient on change in cash sales (△SALES−△REC) differs in magnitude 
across life cycle stages. The magnitude of the coefficient is largest (0.104) for introduction 
firms consistent with operating cash outflows and heavy investment in working capital. It is 
smallest (0.020; 0.030) for growth and mature firms largely due to the increase in operating 
cash flows. The coefficients on △SALES−△REC are large in the shake-out and decline stages 
(0.054; 0.041) consistent with firms in these stages suffering from low/negative operating cash 
flows.  
Fourth, the coefficient on PP&E (PPE) differs in both magnitude and signs across life 
cycle stages. Consistent with high PP&E and depreciation expense in the growth life cycle 
stage (see Table 2), the absolute value of the coefficient on PPE (−0.065) is largest for growth 
firms. Moreover, the coefficient on PPE (−0.054) has the second largest absolute value in the 
introduction stage, potentially due to accelerated depreciation by introduction firms. In contrast, 
the absolute value is smaller for shake-out and decline firms (0.005; −0.010), implying that 
these firms liquidate their assets and thus report a small amount of depreciation expense. Lastly, 
the R2 and adjusted R2 are higher in the growth (0.231; 0.142) and mature (0.246; 0.159) 
stages than in the shake-out (0.208; 0.117) and decline (0.200; 0.108) stages. The highest 
concentration of firms and goodness of fit in the growth and mature stages suggest that higher 
detection power is expected for firms in these stages.12  
Table 3 Panel B presents descriptive statistics of estimated discretionary accruals. By 
construction, discretionary accruals are close to zero in all life cycle stages. The standard 
deviation of discretionary accruals is lower for growth (0.105) and mature (0.108) firms and 
higher for introduction (0.238) and decline (0.185) firms. Given that the R2 and adjusted R2 
are also higher for growth and mature firms, normal accrual generating processes in the growth 
and mature stages can be considered more homogeneous than those in the other stages. 
                                           
12 Detection power by each life cycle stage is examined in Section 5.2. 
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Conversely, the higher standard deviation in the introduction and decline stages indicates that 
firms in the early or late life cycle stage are more heterogeneous from each other.  
Table 3 Panel C reports Wald χ2-statistics, computed for testing whether coefficients 
are statistically different across life cycle stages. Significant χ2-statistics indicate that the 
coefficient on change in cash sales (△SALES−△REC) or on PP&E (PPE) in one life cycle stage 
is statistically different from the coefficient in another stage. Panel C shows that the coefficients 
on △SALES−△REC and PPE vary significantly from the introduction stage to the growth, 
mature, shake-out, or decline stage, from the growth to the mature, shake-out, or decline stage, 
and from the mature to the shake-out stage (and vice versa). For example, the coefficient on 
change in cash sales for introduction firms (0.104) is significantly different from that for growth 
firms (0.020) (χ2=278.37). However, neither the coefficient on change in cash sales or the 
coefficient on PP&E is significantly different between shake-out and decline firms (χ2 = 1.81 
and 1.19). In summary, significant variation in the coefficients across life cycle stages reflects 
homogeneity in normal accrual generating processes within each life cycle stage.  
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V. SIMULATION PROCEDURES AND RESULTS  
5.1. Simulation Procedures 
 In this section, I perform simulation procedures similar to Ecker et al. (2013) to evaluate 
the specification and power of tests for detecting accrual manipulation by different 
identifications of estimation samples.13 The specification test captures Type I errors under a 
true null hypothesis of no earnings management and thus, I do not induce earnings 
manipulation (i.e., 0% manipulation). For the power test, I seed earnings manipulation of 
known magnitudes because the test is based on the presumption that a null hypothesis of no 
earnings management is false. Therefore, lower rejection rates (2-8%) are preferred in the 
specification test, and higher rejection rates are directly interpreted as higher detection power 
in the power test.14 The following simulation procedures (Steps (1)-(5)) are repeated 100 times.  
(1) I select 500 event firm-years and match each event firm-year with 30 peer firm-
years. Accordingly, each subsample consists of 31 observations, one event firm-year 
and 30 peer firm-years. The number of observations remains constant throughout the 
samples to equalize the power of tests, which is affected by sample size (Ecker et al. 
2013). The selection criterion for 30 peer firm-years varies across different 
identifications of estimation samples. For industry-based estimation samples, those 
peer firm-years are randomly selected from the same industry (2-digit SIC code) and 
year as the event firm-year. For size-based estimation samples, 30 peer firm-years are 
                                           
13 There are three differences between the simulation procedures used by Ecker et al. (2013) and those used by 
the current study. First, Ecker et al. measure total accruals using the balance sheet approach while this study 
employs the cash flow statement approach (i.e., measures total accruals by subtracting cash flows from operating 
activities (oancf) from earnings before extraordinary items (ibc)). Second, Ecker et al. assume expense 
manipulation while the current study assumes 50% revenue manipulation following Kothari et al. (2005). Third, 
Ecker et al. require 11 observations (one event firm-year and 10 non-event firm-year) for each subsample while 
this study requires 31 observations (one event firm-year and 30 non-event firm-year). The statistics literature 
recommends researchers use at least 10 or more observations per covariate in each regression to obtain precise 
parameter estimates (Harrell 2001; Babyak 2004). Because the modified Jones model has three covariates 
(including 1/Assett-1), I require 30 observations (non-event firm-years) for each regression.  
14 The 95% confidence interval for the rejection rate of 5% ranges from 2% to 8%. If the actual rejection rate falls 
below (above) 2% (8%), the test is misspecified as it rejects too infrequently (frequently), and is biased in favor 
of (against) the null hypothesis (Kothari et al. 2005). 
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defined as observations that are closest in size (lagged total assets) to the event firm-
year in the same year. For life cycle-based estimation samples, peer firm-years are 
randomly selected from the same life cycle and year as the event firm-year.  
(2) I set a partitioning variable PART to 1 for each event firm-year and to 0 for 30 peer 
firm-years.  
(3) For each event firm-year with PART set to 1, I artificially induce accrual 
manipulation of known magnitudes (i.e., 0-20% of total assets with an increment of 
2%) to total accruals.15 Assuming that a part of accrual manipulation occurs through 
revenue manipulation, I also introduce the corresponding revenue manipulation (i.e., 
0-10% of total assets with an increment of 1%) to change in cash sales of the event 
firm-year (i.e., 50% revenue manipulation).  
(4) In each sample, I estimate the modified accrual model using 30 peer firm-year 
observations and apply the estimated coefficients to calculate discretionary accruals. 
(5) I then regress the estimated discretionary accruals proxy (DAP) on PART (i.e., 
DAPit=?̂?+?̂?PARTit+eit). In the specification and power tests, I record the percentage 
of 500 samples where the null hypothesis of non-positive discretionary accruals is 
rejected at the 5% significance level of one-tailed tests.16 For the power tests, rejection 
rates directly reflect detection power.  
                                           
15 Some may argue that assuming 2-20% of total assets as seeded accrual manipulation is unrealistic, although 
this assumption is consistent with prior literature (Kothari et al. 2005; Ecker et al. 2013). However, when the 
number of observations (e.g., N=31) in each cross-sectional subgroup is small, it is not easy to detect even large 
magnitudes of accrual manipulation. When the number of observations increases, detection power naturally 
improves because the standard deviation of the mean discretionary accruals becomes smaller. Thus, large 
magnitudes of accrual manipulation in this study are to show detection power in the context where the power is 
ex ante considerably low. In addition, Wu et al. (2010) report a standard deviation (SD) of discretionary accruals 
(scaled by assets) of 0.10 in a broad sample spanning 1970-2007. Similarly, Klein (2002) reports a corresponding 
SD of 0.19 in 692 U.S. firm-years during 1992-1993. That is, approximately 68% (32%) of discretionary accruals 
are less (greater) than one standard deviation (0.10; 0.19) away from zero, providing the support for the range of 
accrual manipulation in this study.  
16 This study focuses on upward earnings management (i.e., the null hypothesis of non-positive discretionary 
accruals) because upward earnings management is far more common than downward earnings management 
(Kinney and Martin 1994; Dechow et al. 2011).  
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 Steps (1)-(5) describe 1 out of 100 iterations. Consequently, the resulting entire sample 
is comprised of 50,000 event firm-years, each matched with 30 peer firm-years.17 When testing 
the specification and power in smaller samples, I randomly select 500, 1000, 2000, 5,000, 
10,000 and 15,000 observations from the population (N=134,944) before Steps (1)-(5). I then 
follow the same procedures (100 iterations for Steps (1)-(5)) with one exception: In Step (1), I 
select 50 event firm-years (instead of 500 event firm-years) to avoid using the same firm-year 
as either an event firm-year or a non-event firm-year multiple times. 
5.2. Simulation Results-Sample by Each Life Cycle Stage 
 In this section, I investigate whether the specification and power of tests for detecting 
accrual manipulation vary across life cycle stages. The detection of accrual manipulation could 
differ across life cycle stages because the ability of a firm’s life cycle to capture homogeneity 
in normal accrual generating processes changes across life cycle stages. Table 4 presents the 
simulation results by each life cycle stage under the null hypothesis of non-positive 
discretionary accruals. For test specification, I consider rejection rates ranging from 2 to 8% to 
be an indication of well-specified tests. Panel A of Table 4 shows that when there is no 
manipulation (i.e., column of 0% manipulation), life cycle-based estimation samples generate 
well-specified tests in each life cycle stage with rejection rates ranging from 5.24 to 7.32%. 
Panel A also reports that detection power is highest among growth and mature firms and lowest 
among introduction and decline firms, consistent with firms in the early or late life cycle stage 
being more heterogeneous from each other. Also, the gap in detection power between 
growth/mature firms and introduction/shake-out/decline firms becomes larger as the 
manipulation level increases. For instance, at 2% manipulation, all life cycle stages show 
                                           
17 Following Ecker et al. (2013), I analyze detection rates at the subsample level (50,000 subsamples each 
consisting of one event firm-year and 30 non-event firms-years instead of 100 samples each consisting of 500 
event firm-years and 15,000 non-event firm-years). At the sample level, detection rates will approach 100% even 
at small seeded discretionary accruals levels quickly for all models because firm-specific idiosyncrasies are 
averaged out.  
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comparable levels of rejection rates while at 12% manipulation, the growth and mature stages 
show significantly higher rejection rates (42.22; 46.76) than the introduction, shake-out and 
decline stages (20.22; 21.61; 15.15).  
 Life cycle-based identification of estimation samples offers finer partitions where such 
partitions are determined by life cycle persistence. Panel B of Table 4 presents the results of 
the specification and power tests by life cycle-based estimation samples when samples are 
restricted to firms whose life cycle stage remains unchanged for 2 or 3 consecutive years. For 
comparison, the simulation results on life cycle-based estimation in a large U.S. sample 
(N=134,944) are also provided (Life Cycle-Year). A sample of two-year persistence includes 
firms that remain in their initial life cycle stage in year t+1. Similarly, a sample of three-year 
persistence includes firms that remain in their initial life cycle stage in year t+1 and t+2. When 
samples are restricted to firms with the same life cycle for 2 (3) consecutive years, detection 
power improves by 14% (26%) on average compared to when there is no sample restriction by 
life cycle persistence.18 For example, at 10% seeded manipulation, the rejection rate increases 
from 27.80% to 32.59% (37.31%) by restricting to samples with two-year (three-year) life 
cycle persistence. This improvement in detection power suggests that life cycle transitions 
indeed capture significant changes in normal accrual generating processes. Overall, results by 
each life cycle stage and on life cycle persistence show that detection power varies across life 
cycle stages, consistent with different degrees of homogeneity in normal accrual generating 
processes in each life cycle stage.  
5.3. Simulation Results-Large U.S. Sample  
 In this section, I compare the performance of life cycle-based estimation samples to that 
of industry-based, size-based or two other alternative estimation samples. I define two other 
                                           
18 To gauge the average improvement in detection power, I first calculate the improvement in detection power 
(divided by the original rejection rate) at each manipulation level and then take the average of all the improvements 
across 2-20% manipulation levels. 
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alternative estimation samples with respect to how peer firm-years are selected: (1) “Whole 
Sample” estimation samples whereby peer firm-years are selected from the entire population 
and (2) “Year” estimation samples whereby peer firm-years are selected from the same fiscal 
year as the event firm-year. 
Table 5 presents the simulation results for a large U.S. sample on the test specification 
and power by different identifications of estimation samples under the null hypothesis of non-
positive discretionary accruals. Panel A of Table 5 reports that, regardless of which 
identification of estimation samples is used, the modified Jones model yields rejection rates 
ranging from 5.22 to 6.61% when no accrual manipulation is seeded. That is, all identifications 
of estimation samples yield well-specified tests for detecting accrual manipulation in a large 
U.S. sample. Panel A also reports the detection power of different estimation samples. First, 
two other alternative estimation samples (“Whole Sample” and “Year”) generate considerably 
lower detection power than industry-based, size-based, and life cycle-based estimation samples 
at 6-20% manipulation. These results indicate that the use of finer cross-sectional partitions 
(e.g., by industry) is more beneficial in the detection of accrual manipulation. Second, at 2-6% 
manipulation, industry-based, size-based, and life cycle-based estimation samples yield 
comparable levels of detection power for accrual-based earnings manipulation. However, at 
larger magnitudes of manipulation (8-20%), life cycle-based and size-based estimation samples 
outperform industry-based estimation samples in detection power. For example, at 12% 
manipulation, the modified Jones model estimated by life cycle and year (by size and year) 
yields the rejection rate of 34.94% (34.91%) while the same model estimated by industry and 
year generates 28.70% rejection rate (i.e., approximately 20% improvement in detection 
power). Last, Panel A of Table 5 shows that there is a small difference between selecting peer 
firms based on an absolute cut-off, such as quintiles (i.e., absolute peer group approach) and 
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selecting the event firm’s 30 closest-in-size neighbors (i.e., relative peer group approach) while 
the latter still performs better than the former.19 
  I further investigate whether combining life cycle-based identification of estimation 
samples with other identifications can improve detection power. For this analysis, I select an 
event firm-year from each life cycle stage and match the event firm-year with its peers from 
the same industry or similar size groups.20 Panel B of Table 5 reports the simulation results on 
these combined identifications of estimation samples. When the event firm-year is defined 
based on its life cycle stage, selecting peers from the same industry and year generates (1) a 
great degree of misspecification (Type I error) at 0% manipulation for introduction and decline 
firms, (2) significantly lower detection power for growth and mature firms, and (3) moderate 
improvement in detection power for shake-out firms compared to when estimation samples are 
identified by life cycle alone (see also Table 4 Panel A). The results for size peers in Panel C 
of Table 5 are similar. Overall, the combined identifications do not provide much improvement 
in the detection of accrual manipulation relative to a stand-alone identification of estimation 
samples by life cycle.  
5.4. Simulation Results-Small U.S. Sample  
 Smaller samples face the problem of substantial sample attrition and require higher 
levels of homogeneity in accrual generating processes within estimation samples. Due to these 
unique characteristics of smaller samples, the results for a large sample may not hold in smaller 
samples.  
To investigate the specification and power by different identifications of estimation 
samples in smaller samples, I randomly select 500, 1,000, 2,000, 5,000, 10,000 and 15,000 
                                           
19 Ecker et al. (2013) emphasize two disadvantages of the absolute approach compared to the relative peer group 
approach. First, the absolute approach does not ensure symmetry in the selection of peer firms. Second, the 
absolute peer group approach requires the full cross-section of firms to determine the initial partitions.   
20 When selecting industry peers or size peers of each event firm-year, such peers are not necessarily from the 
same life cycle stage as the event firm-year. 
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observations from a large U.S. sample (N=134,944) as a representation of smaller samples. I 
begin with 500 observations because life cycle-based estimation samples (without year 
classification) impose no sample loss in sample size of 500 and above. Also, life cycle-based 
estimation samples (with year classification) no longer suffer from sample attrition in sample 
size of 15,000 and above. Thus, I estimate the modified Jones model by life cycle (without year 
classification) when sample size is between 500 and 15,000, and estimate the model by life 
cycle and year when sample size is 15,000 firm-year observations and above. The choice of 
life cycle (without year classification) or life cycle and year classification based on the sample 
size enables comparison between life cycle-based estimation samples and size-based 
estimation samples, free from sample attrition issues.21 I also include two other alternative 
estimation samples (“Whole Sample” and “Year”) because these estimation samples are 
considered as substitutes for industry-based, size-based, and life cycle-based estimation 
samples especially when sample size is small because of their “less strict data availability 
requirements” for a firm to be included for analysis.22  
Table 6 reports that in smaller samples, all estimation samples generate well-specified 
tests for detecting accrual manipulation with rejection rates ranging from 4.36% to 7.96%. Also, 
Table 6 shows that rejection rates from “Whole Sample” and “Year” estimation samples are 
significantly lower than those from industry-based, size-based, and life cycle-based estimation 
samples. For instance, when sample size is 15,000, life cycle-based estimation samples 
                                           
21 Estimation samples by similar size and year (where similar size peers are defined as 30 closest-in-size neighbors) 
impose no sample loss if it satisfies the number of observations in each year required for estimating the accrual 
model. Also, estimation samples by life cycle (without year classification) impose no sample loss in smaller 
samples. Thus, it is unclear which one (estimation samples by size vs. estimation samples by life cycle or 
estimation samples by size and year vs. estimation samples by life cycle) is an apples to apples comparison in 
smaller samples. However, if estimation samples by life cycle (in sample size of 500 to 15,000) outperform both 
(1) estimation samples by size and (2) estimation samples by size and year in detection power, life cycle-based 
estimation samples can be considered superior to size-based estimation samples.  
22 For “Year” estimation samples, a sample size of 500 observations is excluded from the analysis because the 
number of observations is less than 31 firm-years for each fiscal year. Note that, in this study, the sample period 
spans 25 years (from 1988 to 2012). Therefore, at least 775 (=31×25 years) observations are required for “Year” 
estimation samples. 
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improve detection power by approximately 31% (29%) on average compared to “Whole 
Sample” (“Year”) estimation samples. Life cycle-based estimation samples are also superior to 
industry-based estimation samples in sample retention and detection power. Industry-based 
estimation samples impose sample attrition in all smaller samples and generate at least 5% 
lower rejection rates than life cycle-based estimation samples at 10-20% manipulation. 
Similarly, life cycle-based estimation samples outperform both size and size-year estimation 
samples in detection power, consistent with smaller samples having firms that differ in size to 
a greater extent. More specifically, when sample size is 1,000, life cycle-based estimation 
samples generate an 11.54% rejection rate while size (size-year) estimation samples yield an 
8.62% (9.88%) rejection rate at 4% manipulation. The gap in detection power between life 
cycle-based and size-based estimation samples increases when the seeded manipulation 
increases. For example, at 12% seeded manipulation, the rejection rate by life cycle-based 
estimation samples is 36.82% while the rejection rate by size-based estimation samples is only 
27.74% when sample size is 1,000. Similar patterns are observed in other smaller samples. 
Hence, the advantages of using life cycle-based estimation samples over other available 
estimation samples (especially, size-based estimation samples) are maximized in smaller 
samples. 
5.5. Simulation Results-International Sample  
 In this section, I evaluate sample attrition issues in international settings, using 
Compustat Global. I then select a comprehensive list of countries of varying sample sizes and 
perform simulation procedures within each country to compare the performance of different 
estimation samples. 
5.5.1. Sample  
To evaluate sample attrition issues in international settings, I begin with all Compustat 
Global firms (359,599 obs.; 109 countries) for the years 1988-2012. Minimum data 
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requirements to calculate the input variables in the modified Jones model result in 242,733 
firm-year observations and 107 countries. The statistics literature (Harrell 2001; Babyak 2004) 
suggests that 10 or more observations per covariate are required for each regression and thus 
30 observations are necessary for estimating the modified Jones model. When researchers 
require 30 or more observations for each industry and year in Compustat Global, 52.43% of 
firm-year observations and approximately 77% of countries are excluded from the sample. 
Even when a more generous requirement (10 or more observations) is imposed, industry-based 
estimation samples suffer from significant sample attrition (i.e., 28.52% of reduction in firm-
year observations; 62 countries (out of 107) are removed from the sample). On the other hand, 
if 30 or more observations are required for each life cycle and year or size quintile and year, 
only approximately 12% of firm-year observations are eliminated from the sample and 20 more 
countries can remain in the sample relative to when the same requirement is imposed for each 
industry and year. Furthermore, estimation samples comprised of closest-in-size neighbors in 
the same year result in the least sample attrition because such samples only require sufficient 
observations for each year. Overall, life cycle-based estimation samples mitigate the problem 
of sample attrition to a significant extent. 
As another test of the efficacy of different identifications of estimation samples in 
smaller samples, I use international settings. I first select a comprehensive list of countries of 
varying sample sizes.23 The same sample filtering procedures in Section 4.1 are employed for 
each country-level analysis. For countries with multiple currencies, I only include observations 
whose values are stated in the country’s main currency. Also, I require 31 observations (one 
                                           
23 Specifically, I investigate the following 22 countries/territories (country/territory name; currency): Australia 
(AUS; AUD), Bermuda (BMU; HKD), Brazil (BRA; BRL), Cayman Islands (CYM; HKD), Chile (CHL; CLP), 
China (CHN; CNY), Denmark (DEU; EUR), France (FRA; EUR), India (IND; INR), Japan (JPN; JPY), Korea 
(KOR; KRW), Malaysia (MYS; MYR), Norway (NOR; NOK), Pakistan (PAK; PKR), Philippines (PHL; PHP), 
Poland (POL; PLN), Russia (RUS; RUB), Singapore (SGP; SGD), Sweden (SWE; SEK), Taiwan (TWN; TWD), 
Thailand (THA; THB), and United Kingdom (GBR; GBP). Due to limited space, I present the simulation results 
for eight countries (Australia, Brazil, China, India, Philippines, Poland, Russia, and Singapore) only. Inferences 
based on the results for the remaining countries are similar to those reported in the paper.  
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event firm-year and 30 peer firm-years) for each of the estimation samples and this requirement 
leads to different sample sizes across three estimation samples. Although different estimation 
samples impose different sample sizes, the number of observations (31 observations) remains 
constant throughout each subgroup to equalize the power of tests. The simulation procedures 
described in Section 5.1 are used with one exception: I select 50 event firm-years (instead of 
500 event firm-years) to avoid using the same firm-year as either an event firm-year or a non-
event firm-year.  
5.5.2. Simulation Results-International Sample  
 Table 8 reports the simulation results for eight countries (i.e., Australia, Brazil, China, 
India, Philippines, Poland, Russia, and Singapore) on the specification and power under the 
null hypothesis of non-positive discretionary accruals. At 0% manipulation, rejection rates are 
within a range of 2-8% (i.e., a threshold for well-specified tests) with exceptions in two 
countries. Specifically, industry-based estimation samples yield misspecified tests with 
rejection rates of 9.12% and 9.54% for Poland and Russia, respectively. To compare the 
performance of different estimation samples aside from sample attrition issues, I estimate the 
modified Jones model either by life cycle (without year classification) or by life cycle and year 
depending on sample size. 
Table 8 also presents varying degrees of detection power across different 
identifications of estimation samples. Detection power for accrual manipulation improves 
when the modified Jones model is estimated by life cycle (or life cycle and year). For instance, 
at 6% manipulation, life cycle-based estimation samples generate the rejection rate of 19.62% 
while industry-based and size-based estimation samples produce 13.18-14.98% rejection rates 
in Brazil. Similarly, at 12% manipulation, life cycle-based estimation samples improve 
detection power by 33% (35%; 49%) compared to industry (size; size-year)-based estimation 
samples in Philippines. Similar patterns are observed in other countries. Moreover, 
33 
improvement in detection power is maximized when the level of seeded manipulation increases. 
In particular, when the largest manipulation level is assumed, life cycle-based estimation 
samples yield 15.76% (10.68%; 8.76%) higher rejection than industry (size; size-year)-based 
estimation samples in Poland. As in smaller U.S. samples, size-based estimation samples show 
only a moderate degree of improvement in detection power compared to industry-based 
estimation samples. In international settings, the number of observations available for the 
analysis is relatively small and thereby smaller samples have firms that are significantly 
different in firm size, leading to the underperformance of size-based estimation samples. Lastly, 
detection power varies across countries. Specifically, detection power in China is twice as high 
as detection power in Australia at 4-20% manipulation levels. A large difference in detection 
power among different countries indicates that normal accrual generating processes captured 
by the modified Jones model also vary across countries, potentially due to institutional features 
that differ in each country. Overall, analysis using international data provides additional support 
for the use of life cycle-based estimation samples over industry-based or size-based estimation 
samples when sample size is small.  
5.6. Simulation Results-Extreme Operating Performance Sample  
 Prior studies (Dechow et al. 1995; Kothari et al. 2005; Stubben 2010; Dechow et al. 
2012) document that accrual models are significantly misspecified for extreme performance 
samples. That is, in extreme performance samples, accruals are highly likely to be classified as 
discretionary when they represent fundamental performance (i.e., Type I errors). Given that 
firms in the same life cycle exhibit comparable levels of firm characteristics (e.g., operating 
cash flows (OCF) and return on assets (ROA)) and have similar earnings manipulation 
incentives, life cycle-based estimation is expected to reduce misspecification in extreme 
performance samples.  
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 Table 9 presents the specification of the modified Jones model estimated by industry 
and year, by size and year, or by life cycle and year in extreme operating performance samples. 
The simulation procedures remain unchanged except that an event firm-year is randomly 
selected from extreme performance samples (i.e., highest (lowest) quintile of operating cash 
flows/return on assets). Panel A of Table 9 reports that industry-based and size-based estimation 
samples generate rejection rates of 19.22 and 13.22%, respectively, for firms with low 
operating cash flows (OCF) while life cycle-based estimation samples reduce the rejection rate 
to 8.54%. When operating cash flows (OCF) are high, size-based estimation samples yield 
slightly lower rejection of 1.88% than the specified test levels (i.e., 2-8%). Both industry-based 
and life cycle-based estimation samples generate well-specified tests for firms with high 
operating cash flows (OCF).24 Panel B of Table 9 presents the simulation results for samples 
with high/low return on assets (ROA). When return on assets (ROA) is low, industry-based 
estimation samples generate the rejection rate of 9.08% whereas life cycle-based and size-based 
estimation samples yield well-specified tests (4.42 and 3.02%, respectively) for detecting 
accrual manipulation. Panel B also shows that all three estimation samples, however, generate 
misspecified tests when an event firm-year is selected from the highest quintile of ROA. 
Together, these findings suggest that life cycle-based estimation mitigates misspecification 
(Type I error) in extreme operating performance samples.  
5.7. Simulation Results-AAER Sample  
5.7.1. Sample  
In this section, I compare the power of industry-based, size-based, and life cycle-based 
estimation samples in detecting actual earnings manipulation. The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has published details of financial reporting related enforcement 
                                           
24 Type I and Type II errors are trade-offs. Hence, too low rejection rates (low Type I errors) are problematic 
because such rates imply low power (high Type II errors) in the detection of accrual manipulation.    
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actions in a series of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) since 1982.25 
The AAERs database primarily includes enforcement actions against firms in which the SEC 
alleges that earnings manipulation has taken place (Dechow et al. 2011). Therefore, I employ 
those enforcement actions in the AAERs database as a sample of actual earnings manipulation. 
Among many other advantages, a primary advantage of using this database is that researchers 
do not need to assume the magnitude and channels of earnings manipulation because the SEC 
identifies a group of economically significant manipulations from various sources (Dechow et 
al. 2011). Accordingly, the use of the AAERs sample can avoid potential biases induced by 
researchers’ individual earnings manipulation classification schemes (Dechow et al. 2011). The 
AAERs, however, do not capture earnings management occurring within GAAP because the 
SEC mainly pursues accounting misstatement cases involving GAAP violations.26  
 I use several filters to classify the SEC’s enforcement actions as earnings manipulation 
firm-years. I begin with 1,105 enforcement actions. First, I restrict analysis to the AAERs 
where actions are brought against firms pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.27 This restriction excludes enforcement actions against firms with wrongdoing 
unrelated to financial misstatements (e.g., bribes). Second, I require each investigation to be 
related to annual filings because I use annual data to estimate discretionary accruals, a proxy 
for earnings manipulation. Third, I require firms to be a respondent in any of the regulatory 
proceedings associated with the enforcement action. By doing so, I exclude enforcement 
actions brought against auditors or employees. In addition, I exclude enforcement actions if 
they occur in regulated industries or in relation to firms headquartered outside North America. 
                                           
25 The 2012 version of the AAERs database is kindly provided by Gerald S. Martin.  
26 Firms can manipulate earnings within the rules of GAAP in many ways. For example, some firms offset one-
time gains from big asset sales with restructuring charges (to keep earnings from rising so high that they can’t be 
topped the following year) or time asset purchases and sales to produce gains when needed (Smith et al. 1994).  
27 Section 13(a) requires issuers whose securities are registered with the SEC to file reports as required by the 
SEC's rules and regulations. The financial statements contained in the filings are required to comply with 
Regulation S-X, which in turn requires conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
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The above filtering procedures generate 586 enforcement actions, in which firms are alleged 
to manage earnings. Lastly, I convert 586 enforcement actions into earnings manipulation firm-
years. The final AAERs sample consists of 928 earnings manipulation firm-years.28  
5.7.2. Simulation Results-Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) Sample 
 To evaluate detection power for actual accrual manipulation by different identifications 
of estimation samples, I employ the simulation procedures described in Section 5.1. In the 
simulations, I select 50 event firm-years from 928 observations in the AAERs sample and 
match each event firm-year with its 30 peers defined by the same industry and year, or by 
similar size in the same year, or by the same life cycle and year. For the rest of the procedures, 
I follow Step (2), (4), and (5) in Section 5.1 and repeat these Steps 100 times.29  
Panel A of Table 10 reports the results for detection power by industry-based, size-
based, and life cycle-based estimation samples. Because a null hypothesis of no earnings 
management is false in the AAERs sample, high (low) rejection rates can be directly interpreted 
as high (low) detection power. Panel A shows that while industry-based and size-based 
estimation samples generate comparable levels of rejection rates (13% and 14%), life cycle-
based estimation samples yield the highest rejection rate, 19%. In other words, detection power 
for actual accrual manipulation is 46% (36%) higher when the accrual model is estimated by 
life cycle and year than by industry and year (by size and year), reflecting that life cycle-based 
estimation samples provide better predictions for actual earnings manipulation compared to 
existing estimation samples. 
I further investigate how the detection power of life cycle-based estimation samples 
varies across life cycle stages. Panel B of Table 10 presents the simulation results by each life 
                                           
28 Some enforcement actions occur over multiple fiscal periods. For example, Sunbeam Corporation was alleged 
to employ improper earnings management techniques (e.g., “cookie jar” reserves) for the last quarter of 1996 until 
June 1998. Due to the enforcement actions whose violation periods span multiple fiscal years, 586 enforcement 
actions are converted to 928 firm-years. 
29 For the AAERs analysis, annual Compustat data are pulled using the DATAFMT=STD flag. The use of this flag 
is to ensure that the original “as reported” and unrestated data are employed. 
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cycle stage. Among 928 earnings manipulation firm-years, 230 (339, 230, 70, and 59) firm-
years belong to the introduction stage (growth, mature, shake-out, and decline stage, 
respectively). The distribution of AAERs firm-years across life cycle stages is different from 
that of a large U.S. sample (N=134,944). Specifically, growth firms make up the largest portion 
of AAERs firm-year observations (36.53%), followed by introduction and mature firms 
(24.78%). Panel B of Table 10 also shows that detection power is highest for introduction firms. 
The mean total accruals (TA) and working capital accruals (WCA) indicate that introduction 
firms in the AAERs sample have extremely higher levels of TA (0.017) and WCA (0.123) than 
those in a large U.S. sample. Therefore, higher detection power for introduction firms implies 
that these firms engage in larger magnitude of manipulation when they actually manipulate 
earnings.30   
Finally, I investigate whether combining life cycle-based identification of estimation 
samples with other identifications improves detection power. I select an event firm-year from 
each life cycle stage and match it with its industry peers (i.e., the same industry and year) or 
size peers (i.e., closest-in-size neighbors in the same year). Panel C of Table 10 presents the 
results for these combined identifications. While industry-based estimation samples improve 
detection power for earnings manipulation by decline firms, life cycle-based estimation 
samples alone generate higher detection power for firms in the other stages. Collectively, Table 
10 provides evidence for the advantages of using life cycle-based estimation samples over 
existing estimation samples in detecting actual earnings manipulation.  
 
 
 
                                           
30 The AAERs database (provided by Gerald S. Martin) does not include the amount of earnings (or other income 
statement items) that is manipulated by a company. Nevertheless, Panel B of Table 10 provides a general idea of 
the magnitude of manipulation by the AAER sample companies in each life cycle stage.  
38 
VI. REEXAMINATION OF PRIOR EARNINGS MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
6.1. Reexamination of Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003)  
Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (DRT) (2003) examine whether boosting discretionary 
accruals to avoid reporting a loss is the reason for the kink in the earnings distribution (i.e., too 
few firms report small losses, too many firms report small profits). DRT find that discretionary 
accruals of small profit firms are statistically indifferent from those of small loss firms, 
inconsistent with the kink being caused by earnings management. They however caution that 
their lack of findings could be attributed to low power (i.e., the accrual models lack power to 
detect earnings management). Therefore, I investigate whether life cycle-based estimation 
samples change the inferences from DRT. In doing so, I first replicate sections of DRT and then 
estimate the accrual models; namely, the lagged discretionary accrual model and forward-
looking discretionary accrual model, by life cycle and year.31 DRT estimate these accrual 
models by industry (2 digit SIC) and year, requiring 10 or more observations for each industry 
and year. 
 Panel A of Table 11 presents the replication results for DRT. Consistent with their 
findings, discretionary accruals using the lagged discretionary accrual model (forward-looking 
discretionary accrual model) for small profit firms are 0.022 (0.024) and insignificantly 
different from 0.018 (0.017) reported for the small loss group (p=0.173; p=0.332). Panel B of 
Table 11 reports the results by using life cycle-based estimation samples. The number of 
observations (N) doubles in Panel B because regression requirements (10 or more observations) 
are more easily met for life cycle-based estimation samples than for industry-based estimation 
samples. Compared to industry-based estimation samples, I find that life cycle-based 
                                           
31 Both the lagged discretionary accrual model and forward-looking discretionary accrual model are “adjusted” 
modified Jones models. Specifically, both models make an adjustment for the expected increase in credit sales. In 
addition, the lagged discretionary accrual model includes the lagged value of total accruals in the modified Jones 
model to capture predictable accruals. Finally, the forward-looking discretionary accrual model further adds future 
sales growth to the lagged discretionary accrual model.  
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estimation samples generate lower discretionary accruals (0.014; 0.015) for small loss firms 
under both models, increasing the difference in discretionary accruals between small profit 
firms and small loss firms (p=0.029; p=0.052). The significant difference in discretionary 
accruals indicates that the kink in the earnings distribution is caused by earnings management. 
To test whether the results (Table 11 Panel B) are influenced only by observations that are 
added due to milder data requirements in life cycle-based estimation, I conduct the same 
analyses using the restrictive data in Panel A. In Panel C, I show that using the restrictive data 
does not change the results, i.e., each accrual model estimated by life cycle and year generates 
lower discretionary accruals for small loss firms (p=0.037; p=0.050). In sum, these results 
imply that DRT’s lack of findings is indeed driven by the low power of the tests and an increase 
in the number of observations is one of the contributors to the improvement in test power.  
6.2. Reexamination of Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998)  
Teoh, Wong, and Rao (TWR) (1998) examine whether initial public offering (IPO) 
firms have high positive issue-year earnings and discretionary accruals. Using industry-based 
estimation samples, TWR find evidence that IPO firms report high earnings during the IPO by 
reporting discretionary accruals aggressively. To gauge the extent to which their results are 
driven by the misspecification of accrual models in the IPO setting, I estimate discretionary 
accruals for a sample of firms making initial public offers using life cycle-based estimation 
samples. 
 I first replicate TWR using their sample period (1980-1990). I estimate the modified 
Jones model by industry (2 digit SIC) and year, and the replication results are consistent with 
the findings of TWR. Specifically, the replication results indicate that IPO firms report 
significantly higher discretionary accruals (Mean=10.846% of lagged assets) at the time of the 
IPO (Year 0) and Year 1 and lower discretionary accruals in subsequent years (Year 3, 4, 5, and 
6). I then estimate the same accrual model using industry-based estimation samples but 
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changing the sample period to 1988-2012.32 Consistent with higher discretionary accruals at 
Year 0 and 1 in TWR, I find that discretionary accruals are significantly higher at Year 0 and 1 
for firms making initial public offers between 1988 and 2012 (Table 12 Panel B).  
 Lastly, I estimate the modified Jones model using the sample period 1988-2012 and life 
cycle-based estimation samples to investigate whether life cycle-based estimation samples 
mitigate misspecification in the IPO setting. Table 12 Panel C indicates that the mean 
discretionary accruals (2.765% in Year 0 and 1.425% of lagged assets in Year 1) by life cycle-
based estimation samples are significantly lower than those by industry-based estimation 
samples (4.718% in Year 0 and 2.253% of lagged assets in Year 1). In sum, these findings 
indicate that life cycle-based estimation samples not only increase power of the test but also 
attenuate accrual model misspecification.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
32 The life cycle measure used in this study is based on cash flow information, which becomes available after 
1987. Because I compare the performance of life cycle-based estimation samples to that of industry-based 
estimation samples, I use the sample period from 1988 to 2012 in Table 12 Panel B rather than 1980-1990 in TWR. 
Also, I employ the balance sheet approach to measure total accruals across Table 12 Panel A, B, and C to alleviate 
the concern that the results arise from different measurements (balance sheet approach vs. cash flow statement 
approach) of total accruals.  
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VII. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
7.1. Alternative Accrual Models  
 This study compares different estimation samples using the modified Jones model. To 
investigate whether the tenor of results remain unchanged when using other accrual models, I 
employ two additional models, the Jones model and Dechow-Dichev model (hereafter, DD 
model). The Jones model includes change in sales and PP&E as the determinants of total 
accruals while the DD model includes past, present, and future operating cash flows as the 
determinants of working capital accruals. Both models are originally estimated using time-
series data, but due to strict data requirements imposed by firm-specific estimation, researchers 
commonly estimate these accrual models cross-sectionally. I estimate both models cross-
sectionally using life cycle-based estimation samples and compare the performance of life 
cycle-based estimation samples to that of other existing estimation samples. In particular, the 
DD model is of interest because both a life cycle measure and the DD model utilize cash flow 
information. Untabulated results indicate that the Jones model provides almost equivalent 
detection power to the modified Jones model. I also find that the DD model estimated by the 
life cycle-based method generates a marginally higher rejection rate (8.17%) at 0% 
manipulation, falling into a range of misspecification (less than 2% or greater than 8%). Other 
than slight misspecification at 0% manipulation, life cycle-based estimation samples provide 
higher detection power at 2-20% manipulation than industry-based or size-based estimation 
samples when the DD model is used. These findings suggest that the superiority of life cycle-
based estimation samples does not depend on different specifications of accrual models. 
7.2. Expense Manipulation  
In simulations, I add discretionary accruals to total accruals and change in cash sales 
assuming revenue manipulation. On the other hand, Ecker et al. (2013) employ an “expense 
manipulation” approach whereby they add between 2 and 20% of total assets to the event firm’s 
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ratio of total accruals to lagged assets and do not adjust other variables such as sales or total 
assets. To investigate whether an “expense manipulation” approach changes the inferences 
from the current study, I repeat the simulation procedures assuming expense manipulation. 
Unreported results indicate that when an “expense manipulation” approach is employed, life 
cycle-based estimation samples outperform industry-based estimation samples in detecting 
accrual manipulation in a large U.S. sample and are superior to both industry-based and size-
based estimation samples in smaller U.S. samples. 
7.3. IPO Firms (Extreme Performance Sample Cases) 
 In Section 5.6, I find that life cycle-based estimation samples mitigate misspecification 
in extreme performance samples. Misspecification (Type I error) is expected to be relatively 
high in the IPO setting because IPO firms are generally high performance companies. To 
investigate whether using life cycle-based estimation samples mitigates misspecification in the 
IPO setting, I randomly select event firm-years from a pool of IPO firm-years and match each 
event firm-year with its industry peers or life cycle peers. Unreported results show that 
industry-based estimation samples generate a 16.19% rejection rate while life cycle-based 
estimation samples reduce this percentage to rejection rate of 11.75% at 0% manipulation. 
These results suggest that life cycle-based estimation samples mitigate the possibility of falsely 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no earnings management.  
7.4. Two-way Sorting  
 In this study, I show that combined estimation samples do not provide much 
improvement in detecting accrual-based earnings manipulation compared to when life cycle-
based estimation samples are used alone (see Section 5.3). For this analysis, I randomly select 
event firm-years from each life cycle stage and match each event firm-year with its industry 
peers or size peers. Another way to construct combined estimation samples is to employ two-
way sorting. I sort firm-years on life cycle and on industry independently and then combine 
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these two sorts. For instance, if two firms are in the same industry and life cycle, those firms 
are considered estimation peers. Untabulated results indicate that two-way sorts increase 
detection power by approximately 14% on average. However, this sorting approach no longer 
provides an advantage of using life cycle-based estimation samples, i.e., a higher degree of 
sample retention. Some estimation samples, such as industry-based estimation samples, lead to 
significant sample losses, and combined estimation samples by two-way sorts exacerbate this 
problem. In summary, these supplemental analyses support the use of life cycle-based 
estimation samples in various research settings.   
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
This study proposes an alternative identification of estimation samples using a firm’s 
life cycle. The detection of accrual manipulation relies on the ability of estimation samples to 
capture homogeneity in normal accrual generating processes. Estimation of the modified Jones 
model by life cycle suggests that normal accrual generating processes vary with a firm’s life 
cycle, implying that such processes are homogeneous within each life cycle stage. Detection 
power for accrual manipulation also varies across life cycle stages, with the growth and mature 
stages having the highest detection power. Furthermore, analyses using simulated U.S. and 
international data show that when detecting accrual manipulation, life cycle-based estimation 
samples are superior to industry-based or size-based estimation samples in sample retention, 
specification, and detection power. These advantages of life cycle-based estimation samples 
are maximized in smaller samples including international settings. Life cycle-based estimation 
samples also outperform other existing estimation samples in detecting actual accrual 
manipulation. Lastly, I reexamine Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) and Teoh, Wong, and 
Rao (1998) applying life cycle-based estimation samples. I provide evidence that life cycle-
based estimation samples change the inferences from DRT by improving test power and 
mitigate misspecification in TWR. These findings suggest the need for reexamining other prior 
earnings management studies using life cycle-based estimation samples.  
The scope of the current study is limited to accrual-based earnings manipulation. 
However, if normal cash flow generating processes are homogenous within each life cycle stage, 
the detection of real activities manipulation can also be improved with life cycle-based 
estimation samples. Future research can address whether and how models for detecting real 
activities manipulation (Roychowdhury 2006) generate a more accurate estimate of normal 
cash flows and improve the detection of real activities manipulation when such models are 
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estimated by life cycle. Taken together, earnings management studies can be significantly 
improved with theoretically identified estimation samples: life cycle-based estimation samples. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 Sample Selection for Simulation using U.S. Sample (1988-2012) 
 
Selection Criteria  No. of Firm-Years 
U.S. Compustat firm-years  263,829 
Firm-years in non-regulated industries (i.e., excluding firm-years 
with SIC 4900-4999 or 6000-6999) 
 183,443 
 
With data for calculating total accruals, change in cash sales, 
and PP&E 
 141,106 
 
With the absolute value of total accruals scaled by total assets 
not exceeding one 
 134,944 
Life Cycle Stage  No. of Firm-Years 
 Introduction      25,965 
 Growth      37,180 
 Mature      48,426 
 Shake-out      12,303 
 Decline      11,070 
Total  134,944 
Table 1 reports the sample restrictions imposed by requirements to have the necessary data to compute the 
input variables in the modified Jones model along with the number of firm-year observations by each life 
cycle stage. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables by Each Life Cycle Stage 
(N=134,944) 
 
 
N   
TA 
 
WCA 
 
△SALES 
 
△SALES−△REC 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
Mean 
(Std. dev) 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
Introduction 25,965   
−0.070 
(0.256) 
 
0.058 
(0.207) 
 
0.227 
(0.580) 
 
0.165 
(0.499) 
Growth 37,180   
−0.077 
(0.133) 
 
0.026 
(0.115) 
 
0.272 
(0.453) 
 
0.225 
(0.398) 
Mature 48,426   
−0.083 
(0.101) 
 
−0.005 
(0.082) 
 
0.099 
(0.316) 
 
0.092 
(0.288) 
Shake-out 12,303   
−0.071 
(0.144) 
 
−0.014 
(0.124) 
 
0.013 
(0.366) 
 
0.016 
(0.332) 
Decline 11,070   
−0.061 
(0.214) 
 
−0.002 
(0.163) 
 
−0.016 
(0.398) 
 
−0.016 
(0.364) 
F-stat     56.71  1152.50  1882.54  1463.91 
 
  
PPE 
 
Depr 
 
OCF 
 
ROA 
 
Assett-1 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
Mean 
(Std.dev) 
Introduction 
0.279 
(0.305) 
 
0.064 
(0.161) 
 
−0.384 
(0.863) 
 
−0.457 
(1.087) 
 
235.25 
(1419.79) 
Growth 
0.425 
(0.349) 
 
0.065 
(0.055) 
 
0.132 
(0.147) 
 
0.055 
(0.176) 
 
1754.77 
(5529.78) 
Mature 
0.330 
(0.245) 
 
0.055 
(0.077) 
 
0.138 
(0.117) 
 
0.056 
(0.174) 
 
2971.50 
(7585.76) 
Shake-out 
0.216 
(0.209) 
 
0.044 
(0.040) 
 
0.046 
(0.156) 
 
−0.018 
(0.225) 
 
1582.16 
(5330.64) 
Decline 
0.159 
(0.192) 
 
0.045 
(0.045) 
 
−0.253 
(0.408) 
 
−0.304 
(0.522) 
 
363.60 
(2210.24) 
F-stat  2735.25  216.82  9040.42  5347.81  1181.70 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for key variables by each life cycle stage. All variables are deflated by 
Assett-1 (lagged total assets (at)). Definitions for each variable are as follows: 
TA=total accruals=earnings before extraordinary items (ibc)−cash flows from operations (oancf); 
WCA=working capital accruals=change in current assets (act)−change in current liabilities (lct)−change in 
cash (che)+change in short-term debt (dlc); △SALES=change in sales (sale); △SALES−△REC= change in 
cash sales=change in sales (sale)−change in accounts receivable (rect); PPE=net property, plant, and 
equipment (ppent); Depr=depreciation expense (dp); OCF=operating cash flows (oancf); ROA=return on 
assets=net income (ni)/total assets (at). Table 2 also reports F-tests of whether the mean of each variable 
differs across life cycle stages.  
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Table 3 Model Estimation by Each Life Cycle Stage 
 
Panel A: Model Estimation by Each Life Cycle Stage 
 Introduction  Growth  Mature  Shake-out  Decline 
 
Mean 
(t-stat) 
 Mean 
(t-stat) 
 Mean 
(t-stat) 
 Mean 
(t-stat) 
 Mean 
(t-stat) 
Intercept 
−0.070 
(−32.86) 
 −0.052 
(−46.29) 
 −0.073 
(−93.86) 
 −0.069 
(−37.05) 
 −0.057 
(−21.29) 
1/Assett-1 
−0.006 
(−7.14) 
 −0.046 
(−12.52) 
 −0.037 
(−16.46) 
 −0.049 
(−10.89) 
 −0.013 
(−6.13) 
△SALES−△REC 
0.104 
(33.20) 
 0.020 
(11.56) 
 
 0.030  
(18.67) 
 
 0.054 
(14.02) 
 0.041 
(7.36) 
PPE            
−0.054  
(−10.53) 
 −0.065 
(−33.55) 
 −0.033 
(−17.87) 
 0.005 
(0.75) 
 −0.010 
(−0.94) 
          
R2 0.225  0.231  0.246  0.208  0.200 
Adjusted R2 0.136  0.142  0.159  0.117  0.108 
N 25,965  37,180  48,426  12,303  11,070 
 
 
Panel B: Estimated Discretionary Accruals by Each Life Cycle Stage 
Life Cycle Stage  Mean  Std.dev  Lower 25%  Median  Upper 25% 
Introduction  0.005   0.238  −0.131  0.041  0.152 
Growth  −0.000   0.105  −0.044  0.008  0.062 
Mature  −0.002   0.108  −0.032  0.014  0.049 
Shake-out  −0.003   0.125  −0.067  0.014  0.072 
Decline  0.023   0.185  −0.064  0.029  0.125 
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 f
o
r 
th
e 
ev
en
t 
fi
rm
-y
ea
r 
an
d
 t
o
 0
 f
o
r 
it
s 
3
0
 p
ee
r 
fi
rm
-y
ea
rs
. 
F
o
r 
ea
ch
 e
v
en
t 
fi
rm
-y
ea
r,
 a
cc
ru
al
 m
an
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
 
(0
-2
0
%
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
) 
is
 a
d
d
ed
. 
U
si
n
g
 3
0
 p
ee
r 
fi
rm
-y
ea
rs
, 
d
is
cr
et
io
n
ar
y
 a
cc
ru
al
s 
(D
A
P
it
) 
ar
e 
es
ti
m
at
ed
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
m
o
d
if
ie
d
 J
o
n
es
 m
o
d
el
. 
D
A
P
it
 
is
 t
h
en
 r
eg
re
ss
ed
 o
n
 
P
A
R
T
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
fr
eq
u
en
cy
 o
f 
P
A
R
T
>
0
 w
it
h
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
al
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 (
0
.0
5
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
o
n
e-
ta
il
ed
 t
es
ts
) 
is
 c
o
u
n
te
d
. 
F
o
r 
ex
am
p
le
, 
w
h
en
 a
 f
ir
m
 i
n
 t
h
e 
m
at
u
re
 s
ta
g
e 
m
an
ip
u
la
te
s 
ac
cr
u
al
s 
b
y
 4
%
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, 
th
e 
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 t
h
at
 a
 f
al
se
 n
u
ll
 h
y
p
o
th
es
is
 o
f 
n
o
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
is
 r
ej
ec
te
d
 i
s 
1
1
.9
3
%
. 
P
an
el
 B
 p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 r
es
u
lt
s 
w
h
en
 t
h
er
e 
is
 n
o
 s
am
p
le
 r
es
tr
ic
ti
o
n
 b
y
 l
if
e 
cy
cl
e 
p
er
si
st
en
ce
 (
L
if
e 
C
y
cl
e
-Y
ea
r)
 a
n
d
 w
h
en
 s
am
p
le
s 
ar
e 
re
st
ri
ct
ed
 t
o
 f
ir
m
s 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
li
fe
 c
y
cl
e 
fo
r 
tw
o
 (
2
 Y
ea
r-
P
er
si
st
en
ce
) 
o
r 
th
re
e 
co
n
se
cu
ti
v
e 
y
ea
rs
 (
3
 Y
ea
r-
P
er
si
st
en
ce
).
 E
x
ce
p
t 
fo
r 
th
is
 s
am
p
le
 r
es
tr
ic
ti
o
n
, 
al
l 
th
e 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s 
ar
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
as
 t
h
o
se
 f
o
r 
P
an
el
 A
.
5
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T
a
b
le
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 C
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
 o
f 
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
 S
a
m
p
le
s 
S
im
u
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o
n
 R
es
u
lt
s-
S
p
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
/P
o
w
er
 (
L
ar
g
e 
U
.S
. 
S
am
p
le
) 
 
P
a
n
el
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: 
S
ta
n
d
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lo
n
e 
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en
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ca
ti
o
n
 o
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E
st
im
at
io
n
 S
am
p
le
s 
 
S
ee
d
ed
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an
ip
u
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ti
o
n
 (
%
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at
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n
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at
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C
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T
ab
le
 5
 r
ep
o
rt
s 
th
e 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 r
es
u
lt
s 
o
n
 a
 l
ar
g
e 
U
.S
. 
sa
m
p
le
. 
P
an
el
 A
 p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
5
0
,0
0
0
 s
u
b
-s
am
p
le
s 
w
h
er
e 
th
e 
n
u
ll
 h
y
p
o
th
es
is
 o
f 
n
o
n
-p
o
si
ti
v
e 
d
is
cr
et
io
n
ar
y
 a
cc
ru
al
s 
is
 r
ej
ec
te
d
 a
t 
th
e 
0
.0
5
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
o
n
e-
ta
il
ed
 t
es
ts
. 
E
ac
h
 s
u
b
-s
am
p
le
 c
o
n
si
st
s 
o
f 
o
n
e-
ev
en
t 
fi
rm
-y
ea
r 
an
d
 3
0
 p
ee
rs
 d
ef
in
ed
 b
y
 e
ac
h
 o
f 
th
e 
es
ti
m
at
io
n
 
sa
m
p
le
s.
 S
p
ec
if
ic
al
ly
, 
3
0
 p
ee
rs
 a
re
 s
el
ec
te
d
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
in
d
u
st
ry
 (
2
 d
ig
it
 S
IC
) 
an
d
 y
ea
r,
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
si
ze
 q
u
in
ti
le
 a
n
d
 y
ea
r,
 c
lo
se
st
-i
n
-s
iz
e 
n
ei
g
h
b
o
rs
 i
n
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
y
ea
r,
 
o
r 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
li
fe
 c
y
cl
e 
an
d
 y
ea
r.
 I
 d
ef
in
e 
tw
o
 o
th
er
 a
lt
er
n
at
iv
e 
es
ti
m
at
io
n
 s
am
p
le
s 
w
it
h
 r
es
p
ec
t 
to
 h
o
w
 p
ee
r 
fi
rm
s 
ar
e 
se
le
ct
ed
: 
(1
) 
“W
h
o
le
 S
am
p
le
” 
es
ti
m
at
io
n
 s
am
p
le
s 
w
h
er
eb
y
 p
ee
r 
fi
rm
-y
ea
rs
 a
re
 s
el
ec
te
d
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
en
ti
re
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 (
2
) 
“Y
ea
r”
 e
st
im
at
io
n
 s
am
p
le
s 
w
h
er
eb
y
 p
ee
r 
fi
rm
-y
ea
rs
 a
re
 s
el
ec
te
d
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
fi
sc
al
 y
ea
r 
as
 
th
e 
ev
en
t 
fi
rm
-y
ea
r.
 A
 p
ar
ti
ti
o
n
in
g
 v
ar
ia
b
le
, 
P
A
R
T
 i
s 
se
t 
to
 1
 f
o
r 
th
e 
ev
en
t 
fi
rm
-y
ea
r 
an
d
 t
o
 0
 f
o
r 
it
s 
3
0
 p
ee
r 
fi
rm
-y
ea
rs
. 
F
o
r 
ea
ch
 e
v
en
t 
fi
rm
-y
ea
r,
 a
cc
ru
al
 m
an
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
 
(0
-2
0
%
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
) 
is
 a
d
d
ed
. 
U
si
n
g
 3
0
 p
ee
r 
fi
rm
-y
ea
rs
, 
d
is
cr
et
io
n
ar
y
 a
cc
ru
al
s 
(D
A
P
it
) 
ar
e 
es
ti
m
at
ed
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
m
o
d
if
ie
d
 J
o
n
es
 m
o
d
el
. 
D
A
P
it
 
is
 t
h
en
 r
eg
re
ss
ed
 o
n
 
P
A
R
T
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
fr
eq
u
en
cy
 o
f 
P
A
R
T
>
0
 w
it
h
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
al
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 (
0
.0
5
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
o
n
e-
ta
il
ed
 t
es
ts
) 
is
 c
o
u
n
te
d
. 
F
o
r 
ex
am
p
le
, 
w
h
en
 a
 f
ir
m
 m
an
ip
u
la
te
s 
ac
cr
u
al
s 
b
y
 6
%
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, 
th
e 
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 t
h
at
 a
 f
al
se
 n
u
ll
 h
y
p
o
th
es
is
 o
f 
n
o
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
is
 r
ej
ec
te
d
 i
s 
1
5
.4
6
%
 b
y
 l
if
e 
cy
cl
e
-b
as
ed
 e
st
im
at
io
n
 s
am
p
le
s.
 P
an
el
 B
 (
P
an
el
 C
) 
p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 r
es
u
lt
s 
w
h
en
 l
if
e 
cy
cl
e
-b
as
ed
 e
st
im
at
io
n
 s
am
p
le
s 
ar
e 
co
m
b
in
ed
 w
it
h
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
-b
as
ed
 (
si
ze
-b
as
ed
) 
es
ti
m
at
io
n
 s
am
p
le
s.
 I
n
 t
h
e 
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
s,
 a
n
 e
v
en
t 
fi
rm
-y
ea
r 
is
 c
la
ss
if
ie
d
 b
y
 i
ts
 l
if
e 
cy
cl
e 
st
ag
e 
an
d
 t
h
en
 i
s 
m
at
ch
ed
 w
it
h
 i
ts
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 p
ee
rs
 (
si
ze
 p
ee
rs
).
 T
h
e 
re
m
ai
n
in
g
 s
im
u
la
ti
o
n
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s 
ar
e 
u
n
ch
an
g
ed
.
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p
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Table 7 Sample Attrition in International Sample (1988-2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Requirement  No. of Obs.  
No. of 
Countries 
 
% of  
Reduction in Obs. 
Compustat Global   359,599  109   
Require minimum requirements 
for accrual model estimation 
 242,733  107   
Require 10 (30) or more obs. for 
each country, industry, and year. 
 
173,498 
(115,478) 
 
45 
(25) 
 
28.52% 
(52.43%) 
Require 10 (30) or more obs. for 
each country, life cycle, and 
year. 
 
232,314 
(211,250) 
 
69 
(46) 
 
4.29% 
(12.97%) 
Require 10 (30) or more obs. for 
each country, size rank, and 
year. 
 
233,535 
(213,569) 
 
70 
(44) 
 
3.79% 
(12.01%) 
Require 10 (30) or more obs. for 
each country, size (close 30), 
and year. 
 
240,700 
(235,437) 
 
79 
(55) 
 
0.84% 
(3.01%) 
Table 7 reports sample attrition by different identifications of estimation samples in international settings 
(i.e., Compustat Global).  
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64 
Table 9 Comparison of Estimation Samples 
Simulation Results-Specification (Extreme Performance Sample) 
 
Panel A: Extreme Operating Cash Flows (OCF) 
  Lowest Quintile  Highest Quintile 
Industry (2digit)-Year  19.22%   2.94%  
Size (close30)-Year  13.22%   1.88%  
Life Cycle-Year  8.54%   5.08%  
 
Panel B: Extreme Earnings deflated by total assets (ROA) 
  Lowest Quintile  Highest Quintile 
Industry (2digit)-Year  9.08%   12.62%  
Size (close30)-Year  3.02%   12.74%  
Life Cycle-Year  4.42%   13.56%  
Table 9 reports the simulation results on extreme operating performance sample. Panel A presents the 
percentage of 50,000 sub-samples where the null hypothesis of non-positive discretionary accruals is rejected 
at the 0.05 level of one-tailed tests. Each sub-sample consists of one event firm-year and 30 peers defined 
by each of the estimation samples. An event firm-year is selected from highest (lowest) quintile of operating 
cash flows/return on assets. 30 peers are selected from the same industry (2 digit SIC) and year, closest-in-
size neighbors in the same year, or the same life cycle and year. A partitioning variable, PART is set to 1 for 
the event firm-year and to 0 for its 30 peer firm-years. Using 30 peer firm-years, discretionary accruals 
(DAPit) are estimated from the modified Jones model. DAPit is then regressed on PART and the frequency 
of PART>0 with statistical significance (0.05 level of one-tailed tests) is counted. For example, when a firm 
does not manipulate accruals, the probability that a true null hypothesis of no earnings management is 
rejected is 8.54% by life cycle-based estimation samples in samples with low operating cash flows (OCF). 
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Table 11 Reexamination of Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) 
 
Panel A: Discretionary accruals estimated using industry-based estimation samples (Replication of 
Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna 2003) 
  Small Profit Firms  Small Loss Firms     
  
N  Mean  N  Mean  
Test 
Statistic  p-value 
Lagged 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
 
908  0.024  444  0.017  −1.365  0.173 
Fwd. Look 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
 
908  0.022  444  0.018  −0.971  0.332 
 
Panel B: Discretionary accruals estimated using life cycle-based estimation samples (Non-restricted 
Sample) 
  Small Profit Firms  Small Loss Firms     
  
N  Mean  N  Mean  
Test 
Statistic  p-value 
Lagged 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
 
1,836  0.022  895  0.014  −2.184  0.029 
Fwd. Look 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
 
1,836  0.022  895  0.015  −1.944  0.052 
 
Panel C: Discretionary accruals estimated using life cycle-based estimation samples (Restricted 
Sample) 
  Small Profit Firms  Small Loss Firms     
  
N  Mean  N  Mean  
Test 
Statistic  p-value 
Lagged 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
 
908  0.026  444  0.016  −2.089  0.037  
Fwd. Look 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
 
908  0.026  444  0.017  −1.959  0.050 
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Table 11 Panel A presents the replication results for Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003). Discretionary 
accruals are obtained from estimating the lagged discretionary accrual model and forward-looking 
discretionary accrual model within each industry (2 digit SIC) and year. Differences in discretionary accruals 
between small profit firms and small loss firms are tested using two-sample t-tests. Panel B reports 
discretionary accruals from estimating the same accrual models within each life cycle and year. Panel C 
reports discretionary accruals by life cycle-based estimation samples using the restrictive data in Panel A.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
Table 12 Reexamination of Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) 
 
Panel A: Discretionary accruals estimated using industry-based estimation samples during the sample 
period 1980-1990 (Replication of Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998) 
Year  0  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Mean  10.846  3.740  0.765  −0.122  −1.380  −1.794  −0.842 
t-stat  24.533  7.504  0.987  −0.714  −2.591  −2.585  −1.250 
Obs.  1,554  1,365  1,154  990  732  467  363 
 
Panel B: Discretionary accruals estimated using industry-based estimation samples during the sample 
period 1988-2012 
Year  0  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Mean  4.718  2.253  0.740  0.126  0.281  −0.336  0.043 
t-stat  15.569  7.067  1.937  −0.047  0.410  −1.360  −0.265 
Obs.  5,249  5,093  4,769  4,293  3,954  3,711  3,298 
 
Panel C: Discretionary accruals estimated using life cycle-based estimation samples during the sample 
period 1988-2012  
Year  0  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Mean  2.765  1.425  0.059  −0.516  −0.242  −0.659  −0.318 
t-stat  8.812  4.337  −0.075  −1.774  −0.922  −2.040  −1.038 
Obs.  5,286  5,126  4,798  4,315  3,975  3,732  3,315 
Table 12 Panel A presents the replication results for Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998). Discretionary accruals are 
obtained from estimating the modified Jones model within each industry (2 digit SIC) and year for the years 
1980-1990. The mean discretionary accruals for a sample of firms making initial public offers (IPOs) are 
presented as a percentage of lagged total assets. Differences in discretionary accruals between IPO firms and 
all other firms are tested using two-sample t-tests. Panel B reports discretionary accruals from estimating the 
same accrual model using industry-based estimation samples for the years 1988-2012. Panel C reports 
discretionary accruals by life cycle-based estimation samples for the years 1988-2012.   
 
 
 
 
 
